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i 
Abstract 
 
We analyze if Norwegian equity funds have a tendency to alter their risk based on 
their performance relative to competing equity funds, called mutual fund 
tournament. The incentive for this behavior is that fund managers are competing 
for investor capital, as an increase in a fund’s asset value often yields higher 
compensation, and investors often chose funds based on their previous 
performance. Our sample period reaches from 1998 to 2012 and includes monthly 
returns from 77 Norwegian equity funds. We apply a contingency table approach, 
as well as a regression approach to examine if funds participate in annual 
tournaments. Our results show mixed evidence of tournament behavior in the 
Norwegian equity fund industry. We find signs of tournament behavior from 2006 
to 2012, but when testing for robustness in this period, the tests show indistinct 
results. Overall our analysis shows evidence and tendencies for tournament 
behavior in the Norwegian equity fund market in some periods, however with the 
contradictory results we cannot give a definite conclusion about the presence of a 
Norwegian mutual fund tournament. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We analyze if Norwegian equity funds have a tendency to alter their risk based on 
their performance relative to competing equity funds, called mutual fund 
tournament1. This issue stems from previous studies examining if fund managers 
actively seek to alter their risk in order to take advantage of the asymmetric 
mutual fund flow-performance relationship. This asymmetry means high-
performing funds tends to receive higher inflow than the outflow under-
performers are penalized with. Our research question is: 
 
Do Norwegian equity fund managers make risk adjustments to their investment 
portfolio according to mid-year performance? 
 
In 1996, Brown, Harlow and Starks (BHS) proved a significant competitive 
relationship amongst mutual fund managers in the US market, called a “mutual 
fund tournament”. Their findings suggested that funds alter their risk profile 
during the year depending on their performance relative to competing funds, and 
implied that under-performers tend to increase fund volatility to a greater extent 
than well performing funds. After BHS pioneered the research regarding 
tournament behavior, the phenomenon has been researched frequently both in the 
US2 and other markets3. Studies on mutual fund tournaments have never been 
done on the Norwegian market, and this motivates us to explore if there can be 
found similar tendencies in Norway. This market can be intriguing to focus on, 
since it is smaller and more volatile than the markets former research has 
primarily focused on. Because of this and differences such as other rules and 
regulations in the Norwegian market, countries with similar characteristics might 
find our results more interconnected than results produced by previous research 
done on markets such as the US and UK. 
                                                 
1 We call it a mutual fund tournament, even though our data only contains equity funds. This is in 
line with previous studies. 
2 Busse, Jeffrey A. 2001. “Another Look at Mutual Fund Tournaments”. Journal of Financial & 
Quantitative Analysis, 36 (1): 53-73. 
Koski, Jennifer Lynch. Jeffrey Pontiff. 1999. “How are Derivatives Used? Evidence from the 
Mutual Fund Industry”. The Journal of Finance. LIV (2): 791-816. 
Schwarz, Christopher G. 2012. “Mutual Fund Tournaments: The Sorting Bias and New Evidence”. 
Review of Financial Studies. 23 (3): 913-936.  
3 Robjans, Rogèr Otten. 2008. ”Tournaments in the UK Mutual Fund Industry”. Managerial 
Finance, 34 (11): 786-798. 
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The basis of a mutual fund tournament is that fund managers compete with each 
other in order to get new assets. An increase in funds’ asset value yields higher 
compensation to fund managers, as they are often rewarded by a percentage of 
their fund’s asset value (Golec 2003). This creates an incentive for the managers 
to attract new capital, and might create a principal-agent conflict between 
managers and investors. Guercio and Tkac (2008) studied this incentive by 
comparing Morningstar ratings with fund flow. Their findings suggest that mutual 
fund investors use ratings as a primary input in their decision process. This in turn 
provides under-performing fund managers with incentives to increase risk in order 
to improve the probability of ending the year with a higher rating, and hence 
attract more capital. This relationship between flow and performance is consistent 
with the tournament described by BHS and has later been proved by several 
studies such as Chevallier and Ellison (1997), and Kempf and Ruenzi (2008). A 
study by Sirri and Tufano (1998) also found that investors disproportionately 
flock to invest in high performing funds, while not to a similar extent flee low 
performing funds. If managers are compensated based on the fund's inflow, their 
payment has similarities to a call-option, in the sense that raising risk gives a 
higher expected return. Additional incentives for managers to risk shift is that 
good performance equal good personal reputation and employee safety (Hu et al. 
2011).  
 
Other studies regarding mutual fund tournaments have found differing results, 
such as Busse (2001). He found that tournament behavior did not exist in the US 
mutual fund market when testing with daily returns instead of monthly, as BHS 
used. He argues the contradicting results come from daily return autocorrelation 
biasing the monthly volatility estimates. Due to the conflicting results in the US 
market and the different methodologies used, we find mutual fund tournaments an 
interesting topic. 
 
To study the tournament effect in the Norwegian market, we use a similar 
approach as the one used by BHS, as well as parts of the methodology from Busse 
(2001). We use monthly returns from the Norwegian equity funds gathered from 
Oslo Exchange. Our sample period reaches from 1998 to 2012 and includes data 
from 77 Norwegian equity funds. To make our analysis more robust, we separate 
our sample into 10 subsamples. We divide each year into two periods and 
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compare each fund to see if we can observe any changes in risk characteristics 
from one period to the next. We initially use volatility of monthly returns as our 
proxy for risk. To test for tournament behavior we perform a chi-square test. 
Further we check for robustness by also applying volatility of residuals from a 
Flexible Least Squares regression, and average coefficients from the same 
regression. We include these two additional proxies for risk to test if tournament 
behavior is caused by idiosyncratic risk and/or systematic risk change. 
 
We find evidence of tournament behavior from 2006 to 2012, e.g. when splitting 
the periods into 5 months and 7 months, we get a p-value of 0,008 when 
performing a chi-square test with similar methodology as BHS used. But when 
testing for robustness in this period, the tests show indistinct results. Overall our 
analysis shows evidence and tendencies for tournament behavior in the 
Norwegian equity fund market in some periods. However, with the contradicting 
results from our tests, we cannot give a definite conclusion about the presence of a 
Norwegian mutual fund tournament. 
 
Our thesis is divided into six sections. Section 2 and 3 includes relevant 
background material, while section 4-7 contains data, methodology, empirical 
evidence and conclusion. 
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2. Institutional Background 
 
The Norwegian mutual fund industry is closely monitored by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSA). They inflict the industry with a number 
of rules and regulations, e.g. in order be classified as an equity fund in Norway, a 
fund needs to have at least 80 % of its assets invested on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
(OSE). Norwegian equity funds are also required to have stocks in at least 16 
different companies, and no more than 10 % of a fund's assets can be allocated in 
one stock (Finanstilsynet 2012). This shows that a fund, by law, has an obligation 
to be somewhat diversified. Unlike the previously studied US market, Norwegian 
equity funds are not allowed to short sell stocks, which limit their investment 
opportunities. They are however permitted to use derivatives in their portfolio 
composition. . The mutual fund industry has been expanding rapidly in the past 
few years. It has more than tripled in value since 2004, and at the end of Q4 2012 
the total value was NOK 557,6 billion, where 49.9 % of this stems from equity 
funds. 73,4% of the equity funds’ assets are owned by Norwegian investors, 51,2 
% and 48,8 % by institutional investors and private investors respectively. 26,6 % 
of the total equity funds value are owned by foreign investors 
(Verdipapirfondenes Forening 2012). 
 
Mutual funds normally operate with 3 different types of investor fees: Front-end 
load, back-end load and operating expense. Front-end load is the fee you pay 
when you buy a stock in a fund, back-end load is the fee you pay when you sell a 
stock in a fund, and operating expense fee is the management fee and is normally 
paid as an annual percentage of the assets invested in the fund. As mentioned 
earlier, management fee is one of the main incentives for managers to maximize 
the inflow to the fund. 
 
In 2011, Huang, Sialm and Zhang suggested that fund managers have three ways 
to alter the risk profile of their portfolios. The first option is to change the 
allocation of assets and cash; the second option is to buy less risky assets/sell 
risky assets in order to alter systematic risk. Changing the idiosyncratic risk of the 
portfolio is the last option. 
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3. Literature review 
 
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) (BHS) investigate if the competiveness in 
mutual fund industry can affect fund managers decisions. They introduce an 
annual "tournament" between mutual funds, were the managers compete for fresh 
capital based on their performance relative to each other. This is because most 
mutual fund managers are evaluated by end-year results, and that mutual fund 
ranking systems are usually given annually. In recent years this has changed as 
technology has improved, information and fund ranking are given on a day-to-day 
basis. However, we believe that the annual tournament could still be present 
because newspapers and magazines often present whole-year results and rankings. 
BHS found that funds labeled as mid-year losers tend to increase the risk of their 
portfolio in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than 
mid-year winners. This implies that the competitive mutual fund environment is 
effectively changing how fund managers act, and subsequently might change their 
objectives from a long-term to a short-term perspective. They also found that as 
investor awareness increased towards fund ranking systems, tournament behavior 
occurred more frequently. This article works as the foundation of our research. 
 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) look at risk-changing behavior inside a mutual fund 
family rather than between different funds, as BHS did. The intuition behind their 
research is that fund managers within a family are incentivized by the top 
management to perform better by direct compensation, and indirect compensation 
such as advertising and marketing funds. Decisions regarding these three activities 
are usually done at the end of the year, such that an intra-firm competition arises 
amongst the fund managers in order to attract the most compensation. Their 
findings suggest that a mutual fund tournament exists within the family; fund 
managers do alter their funds risk profile dependent on their mid-year rank. 
Further, they find evidence that the degree of risk taking is more excessive for 
larger families than for smaller ones. The smaller families actually behave in an 
opposite manner, the mid-year winners take on more risk than losers, suggesting 
cooperation between funds is more present in smaller families. They conclude that 
such tournament behavior inside a mutual fund family is not optimal from an 
investor point of view, since the risk adjustments is not done by the means of 
optimizing portfolio, which causes extra rebalancing costs. The lack of 
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cooperation within the family could also lead to unnecessary agency costs. 
However, the family effect can be favorable in case of a fire sale; According to 
Goncalves-Pinto and Schmidt (2013), funds within families coordinate trade in 
order to avoid the cost of fire sale, which results in a positive net effect for the 
distressed illiquid fund. The principal-agent conflict mentioned in Kempf and 
Ruenzi (2008) is studied more in-depth by Chevalier and Ellison in 1997. 
 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) studied the risk-adjusting behavior of fund managers 
in the light of principal-agent conflict between them and investors. A mutual fund 
manager is motivated by maximizing value by increasing cash inflows, while 
investors are interested in maximizing their risk-adjusted return. Chevalier and 
Ellison put the flow-performance relationship as an implicit incentive for funds to 
alter the risk profile of their portfolios. In the first part of their research, they 
prove that mutual funds’ willingness to hold unsystematic risk is dependent on its 
position relative to the market index at the end of September. Their results suggest 
that fund managers change the riskiness of their portfolios between September and 
December, which is consistent with the incentive to alter risk based on the flow-
performance relationship. This is further studied by Spiegel and Zhang (2012). 
 
Spiegel and Zhang (2012) studied the relationship between mutual fund flows and 
past returns. They show that the convex flow-return relation indicated by prior 
research, i.e. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), is 
erroneous. They state that the empirical models commonly used when researching 
this topic can yield false convexity estimates, because heterogeneity often occurs. 
Spiegel and Zhang (2012) instead use a market share alternative specification for 
their research. With this alternative specification, they conclude that the flow-
return relationship seems to be linear, and even has tendencies for an opposite 
relationship than previous research has indicated. Guercio and Tkac (2008) 
examine the flow-rating relationship, as an extension of flow-performance 
relationship. 
 
Guercio and Tkac (2008) investigate the effect of the Morningstar star rating on 
mutual funds. Morningstar rates funds from 1-5 stars based on their past 
performance and future estimated results. In their study, they find that an upgrade 
or downgrade of the rating on a mutual fund has a substantial effect on flow of 
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capital from retail investors. This suggests that the Morningstar's star rating 
system is the primary input of many mutual fund investors' decisions and has 
economically significant effect on the funds. Discrepancy between this study and 
prior studies is that Guercio and Tkac found that investors punish funds that lose 
its position amongst the top third ranked funds (goes down to 3-star rating). The 
effect from a rating change can be seen as soon as one month after. This effect 
shows that funds with 4-star rating might have different incentives according to 
risk depending on if they are closer to a downgrade or an upgrade. 
 
Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2008) investigate if risk shifting of the fund’s portfolio 
has an impact on the fund's performance. They compare funds that have a stable 
level of risk with funds who risk shifts. Results reveal a strong relationship 
between risk shifting and fund performance. Mutual funds that shift risk tend not 
beat the market, while funds with the most consistent risk levels tend to 
outperform the market. The study implies that even though risk shifting usually 
does not enhance performance, it is often implemented for a number of different 
reasons. One of these reasons is the managers’ incentives to take excessive risk in 
order to possibly increase future fund inflows, which works as the basis for 
mutual fund tournament. 
 
Busse (2001) reviews the methodology used in BHS, and in addition apply his 
own methods to test for tournament behavior in the US market. His results were 
consistent with BHS when using monthly returns. However, Busse also examines 
the same relationship by using daily returns, and shows that the tournament effect 
disappears when using daily data. In his analysis he argues that the effect 
disappears because daily return autocorrelation biases the monthly volatility 
estimates. The daily data further reveal that the intra-year change in a funds risk is 
mostly due to changes in the common stock market risk factors. Since daily data 
provided a more precise estimate of volatility, he questions the reliability of 
earlier research. While both BHS and Busse base their research using a 
contingency table approach, Busse also applies a regression methodology as a 
supplement to his research. He explains that it is not clear when mutual fund 
managers risk shift according to performance, since ratings and fund flows occur 
on a daily basis. This creates more complexity when researching tournament 
behavior. We follow Busse’s methodology when testing our hypothesis. 
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis  02.09.2013    
Page 8 
In 2005, Goriaev, Nijman and Werker revisited the findings on mutual fund 
tournament initially done by Busse (2001). They used both daily and monthly 
returns, and opposed to Busse (2001), they found that monthly returns are more 
robust to autocorrelation effects than tests based on daily data. This underpins our 
data as we use monthly returns in our study. However, they found little empirical 
evidence of tournament behavior for U.S. equity funds, similar to Busse (2001). 
 
Elton et al. (2010) studied tournament behaviour by using monthly holdings data 
rather than returns as previously used by BHS and Busse (2001). The holdings 
data consisted of US equity funds from 1994 to 2005. They examined two 
different ways to alter the risk profile of a fund’s portfolio; change in the 
percentage of assets invested in cash, and altering the riskiness of their existing 
assets. They divided the year into two parts, the first 7 months and the last 5. By 
comparing the percentage invested in cash in both periods, they found that low 
return funds decreased cash holdings, while high return funds increased cash 
holdings. However, the change was so small that it had no perceptible impact on 
risk. In the second test they followed BHS, but used security weighted beta and 
standard deviation as their risk measures. Their results showed anti-tournament 
behaviour, completely opposite of BHS; high return funds increased risk while 
low return funds decreased risk. 
 
There have been several studies on mutual fund tournaments and similar topics in 
recent years. E.g. Koski and Pontiff (1999) found similar results as BHS (1996), 
although their study showed that mutual funds that used derivatives for hedging 
changed their risk profile to a lesser degree. Schwarz (2012) found that the reason 
for mixed result regarding these tournaments strains from a sorting bias. The 
article by Hu et al. (2011) and Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009) shows that 
employment risk also act as an incentive to engage in tournament behavior. 
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4. Data 
 
The data used in our thesis is extracted from Oslo Exchange and consists of 
monthly returns from 77 Norwegian equity funds. Our sample extends from 
January 1998 to December 2012, a total of 15 years. These funds need to have at 
least 80 % of their assets invested on the Oslo Stock Exchange to be classified as 
a Norwegian equity fund. Since our research is based on annual tournaments, we 
arrange our data year by year. We have chosen to eliminate a fund from a specific 
annual tournament if it either was initiated or removed during that year. This is 
done in order to achieve annual tournaments such that funds are ranked within an 
equal time period (12 months). 
 
Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 includes the median return and standard deviation from all active funds in each year over 
the whole sample 1998 to 2012. The return and standard deviation of Oslo Benchmark index is 
presented yearly. 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of our sample and Oslo Benchmark Index 
(OSEBX). The number of funds has increased during our sample period, and we 
observe that the sample extends over bull and bear markets. To get a large enough 
sample each year we have chosen to include all of the available Norwegian equity 
Number of funds
Return Std.dev Return Std.dev
1998 36 -26,64 % 8,58 % -25,67 % 8,93 %
1999 42 47,03 % 5,57 % 46,94 % 5,21 %
2000 45 3,38 % 5,20 % 4,67 % 3,78 %
2001 51 -15,17 % 6,75 % -14,61 % 7,21 %
2002 55 -34,01 % 8,09 % -30,43 % 7,14 %
2003 59 48,62 % 7,02 % 47,15 % 6,29 %
2004 60 36,70 % 5,54 % 38,30 % 4,86 %
2005 58 43,15 % 5,44 % 40,40 % 5,95 %
2006 58 31,81 % 4,32 % 32,51 % 4,54 %
2007 58 13,13 % 3,70 % 11,46 % 4,81 %
2008 57 -53,46 % 11,96 % -55,06 % 13,06 %
2009 58 72,35 % 6,18 % 70,10 % 5,66 %
2010 58 21,15 % 6,83 % 17,50 % 7,04 %
2011 64 -18,25 % 5,40 % -13,07 % 6,00 %
2012 66 16,01 % 4,56 % 15,87 % 3,51 %
Median (funds) Oslo Benchmark Index
GRA 19003 – Master Thesis  02.09.2013    
Page 10 
funds. Some of the funds have a strategy that involves investing a small portion of 
their assets in foreign or unlisted stocks.  
 
The funds in our sample are classified by size and type based on Morningstar 
Style Box (Morningstar 2013) showed in table 2: 
 
 
Table 2 shows how Morningstar classify the 77 funds of our sample.  They are classified on 
whether they are Value, Growth or Mix funds, as well as their size. 11 funds are not included in 
the table above because Morningstar provides no information about them. 
 
In Appendix 1 we have graphed the cumulative average fund return and Oslo Børs 
Benchmark from 1998 to 2012. In the graph we see that the fund returns are 
highly correlated with OSEBX. 
 
For our single-factor and Carhart 4-factor model used in our methodology section, 
we have used Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index as a proxy for the 
Norwegian stock market (Datastream). The rest of the factors, including the risk 
free rate (1 month NIBOR), were downloaded from Bernt Arne Ødegaard’s 
webpage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value 51 Large 18
Growth 2 Medium 42
Mix 13 Small 6
Sum 66 Sum 66
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5. Methodology 
 
The methodology consists of three different approaches testing our research 
question. Our main goal is to assess whether funds, relative to competing funds, 
alter risk in the latter part of the annual assessment period. 
 
5.1 Annual splits 
Throughout our research we divide the annual tournament into different annual 
splits. We have chosen to separate in the following way (M=4-8):  4/8, 5/7, 6/6, 
7/5 and 8/4. E.g. 4/8 split meaning the first period contains the first 4 months 
(January-April), and the second is the last 8 months (May-December). Financial 
information and ratings regarding funds are available on a daily basis, so we 
might find that managers risk shift early or late in the annual tournament. By 
adding multiple separations of the year, we will be able to detect which month 
managers tend to change their risk according to their relative performance.  
 
5.2 The BHS approach 
First, we will allocate equity funds based on performance. This is done by 
calculating the cumulative return of each fund after M-months for each of the 15 
annual samples.  
 
We calculate the first period cumulative return (RTN) as follows: 
 
(1)                                                         
 
Where rj is the j'th fund return, y is the tournament year and 1-12 are the months 
of the year, January(1) to December(12). We will then annually rank the RTN of 
each fund from highest to lowest, and separate them into two groups, first period 
winners and losers. Winners are classified as the funds that are above the first 
period median RTN value, and losers are classified as funds that are below. If a 
fund is the median in a specific annual tournament, we delete it from that 
tournament, since they cannot be classified as a winner or a loser. In total we 
deleted 5 median funds. We also examine if being an “extreme” winner or loser 
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yields different results, where we classify winners and losers if they are over third 
quartile RTN value or under first quartile RTN value respectively. After 
classifying winners and losers, we will calculate the risk adjusted ratio (RAR). 
This is a measure of the ratio between the volatility of returns before and after the 
cutoff mark (M). RAR is calculated by taking the standard deviation of the second 
period’s monthly returns (M+1 to 12) and divide it by the standard deviation of 
the first period’s monthly returns (1 to M).  
 
(2)          
             
   
     
        
    
             
  
   
   
  
 
Where 1p and 2p is first and second period respectively. RAR shows if the returns 
of a fund is more volatile after the M-month cutoff (>1) or less volatile (<1), and 
is an indication of whether the manager of the fund makes risk adjustments to his 
portfolio from the first to the second period of the year. We will separate the RAR 
values into two groups, “high risk shift” and “low risk shift”, they are allocated 
based on if the fund is above or below the median RAR value respectively. Now 
we have winners/losers and high/low risk shift for each fund over the course of 15 
years. To test our research question we create a (RTN, RAR) pair for every fund, 
each year and split these pairs into four cells: (winner/high risk shift), (loser/high 
risk shift), (winner/low risk shift) and (loser/low risk shift).  
  
Our null hypothesis: 
(3)  
    
    
 
    
    
                      
 
Our alternative hypothesis: 
(4)  
    
    
 
    
    
                      
 
Where L is loser and W is winner. As in BHS we form a 2x2 contingency table 
that contain all the funds for a specific year. To test our null hypothesis, we 
perform a chi-square test comparing the predicted table with the actual cell 
frequency table and see if they are significantly different. The predicted allocation 
of funds in our contingency table is 25 % in each cell. It is important to note that 
although we find a significant difference with the chi-square test, tournament 
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behavior is only present if the cells (loser/higher risk shift) and (winner/lower risk 
shift) has significantly higher cell frequencies than the other two cells. If the cell 
frequencies would come out significant in the opposite direction than our 
alternative hypothesis we define it as anti-tournament. This is a type of 
tournament as well, just in a different manner than we expect. 
 
5.3 Testing for systematic and idiosyncratic risk change 
In the BHS approach we used RAR as a proxy for risk; in this section we will 
explain how we perform a similar test with two different proxies for risk. We have 
one proxy for systematic risk, and one for idiosyncratic risk. Testing using 
idiosyncratic risk will be interesting to look at because we eliminate any risk 
shifting that is caused by general market factors. This will act as an approximation 
of the risk the mutual fund managers can control. If tournament behavior is 
present, testing using systematic risk could show if market factors is the cause for 
such behavior.  
 
For idiosyncratic risk we will use standard deviation of residuals from a 4-factor 
regression, and for systematic risk we will use coefficients from the same 
regression. To extract residuals and coefficients we have chosen to use a method 
called Flexible Least Squares4 (FLS). Unlike the standard OLS method, FLS 
assumes time varying coefficients and provide us with different coefficients each 
month. Berzins, Liu and Trzcinka (2013 Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 
forthcoming) states that there are several studies showing how mutual fund 
coefficients vary over time. We apply FLS on a Carhart 4-factor model shown in 
equation 5. In the regressions we use monthly fund return, Oslo Børs Benchmark 
Index (OSEBX), 1m NIBOR as risk free rate, SMB, HML and PR1YR 
(momentum). The market return factor is OSEBX risk premium. The model 
includes a lagged variable of each factor to control for non-synchronous trading 
problems, which is autocorrelation caused by infrequently traded stocks. These 
stocks have downward biased estimates. (Dimson, 1979). Both Busse (2001) and 
Dimson (1979) included this lagged variable in their regression with monthly 
data. 
                                                 
4 FLS is a regression approach developed by Kalaba and Tesfatsion (1989) and further developed 
by Lutkepohl and Herwartz in 1996. 
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Carhart 4-factor model: 
(5)                 
 
                            
 
Where Rf is the risk free rate, q depicts the four different factors and t is the 
month. 
 
When performing FLS regression we obtain one coefficient per observation. In 
this way we are able to average coefficient and calculate the standard deviation of 
residuals over our different annual splits; M=4-8. 
 
The risk shifts are calculated in line with Busse (2001): 
 
(6)                       
      
      
  
 
Idiosyncratic risk is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from period 2 
divided by the standard deviation of residuals from period 1. 
 
(7)                     
              
              
 
 
               is the sum of the average coefficient and the average lagged 
coefficient of a given factor from period 2. The denominator is the equivalent 
from period 1. 
 
Equation 6 and 7 are then used in the BHS approach as the variable RAR from 
equation 2 to assign if winners and losers are high or low risk-shifters. The new 
classifications are put in the contingency tables to test our null hypotheses stated 
in equation 3.  
 
5.4 Regression 
In order to widen the scope of our tests, and as a method to check for robustness, 
we also test for tournament behavior by a regression methodology as performed 
by Busse (2001). To test the relationship between fund performance and 
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subsequent risk shift we initially run the following FLS regression to extract 
coefficients and residuals: 
 
(8)                                  
 
Where     is the market return from OSEBX.  
 
We create three proxies for risk in period 1 and 2: 
 
(9)           – Standard deviation of monthly return 
(10)           – Standard deviation of residuals 
(11)              Average coefficient 
 
p depicts period 1 and 2, y is year and j is fund. 
 
With the aim to check if fund performance in period 1 affects risk change, these 
measures are then used in the following cross-sectional OLS regression.  
 
(12)                                           
 
The dependent variable is calculated by taking period 2 risk minus period 1 risk, 
using the measures above. The variable perf is the return in period 1, calculated by 
taking the fund return minus the month’s average return across all funds. In total 
we perform 9 regressions, 3 proxies for risk for 3 annual splits, each year. 
 
By doing the regression we want to find if the variable perf (   has a significant 
negative effect on risk shift, which would be a sign of tournament behavior.  
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6. Empirical evidence 
 
In this chapter we will present the findings of our research in four different 
sections. We define our result as significant if it is under the 5 % significance 
level. 
 
6.1 The BHS approach 
In this section we follow the BHS approach as outlined in the methodology. We 
classify funds as winners/losers based on monthly returns, and high/low risk-
shifters on RAR. We then put them into 2x2 contingency tables to test our 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 3 shows the contingency tables of each of the chosen annual splits (M=4 to 
M=8) over the whole sample. This contains the sum of each cell from each of the 
15 annual tournaments. The P-value shows the statistical significance of how the 
cell frequencies differ from the predicted cell frequencies in a chi-square test. It 
should be kept in mind that even if we get a significant p-value, it can still be that 
the result significantly shows anti-tournament behaviour i.e. losers with low risk 
shift is more frequent than losers with high risk shift. The table shows the results 
for both median and quartile separation. 
 
Table 3: 
 
Table 3: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. The table shows the frequency of funds in each cell of the contingency table in all the 
Observations
Low RAR High RAR Low RAR High RAR P-value
(4,8) 820 184 226 226 184 0,003***
(5,7) 820 195 215 215 195 0,162
(6,6) 820 205 205 205 205 1,000
(7,5) 820 214 196 196 214 0,209
(8,4) 820 202 208 208 202 0,675
(4,8) 420 88 122 122 88 0,001***
(5,7) 420 94 116 116 94 0,032**
(6,6) 420 97 113 113 97 0,118
(7,5) 420 111 99 99 111 0,242
(8,4) 420 106 104 104 106 0,845
WinnerLoser
MEDIAN
QUARTILES
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annual splits (in parentheses). An annual split is how we divide each year, where the first digit 
represents the number of months included in period 1, and the second digit the number of months 
in period 2. The sample period is from 1998 to 2012 and includes 77 funds. Under “Median”, 
winners and losers are classified table as being above or below the median fund return 
respectively. Under “Quartiles”, winners and losers are classified in this table as being above the 
third quartile fund return or below the first quartile fund return respectively. RAR is the risk-
adjusted ratio, where the standard deviation of returns in period 2 is divided by the standard 
deviation in period 1. Low RAR and High RAR are classified as being below or above median risk 
shift.  
 
Our results reveal that the annual split 4/8 yields the most diverging observations, 
both in median and quartiles winners/losers. These results indicate that 
tournament behaviour is present when setting the cut-off point at April. Further, 
we observe that the annual split 5/7 gives significant results when separating by 
quartiles. Interestingly, we find some signs of anti-tournament behaviour, 
although none of them provides significant p-values. The table generally does not 
show a strong indication of tournament behaviour. In order to examine if the 
behaviour is only present in some time periods and as a means for robustness 
testing, we have chosen to divide our full sample of 15 annual tournaments into 
several temporal sample partitions. We divide the full sample into the 10 
subsamples as shown in table 4.  
 
When dividing into subsamples we sum the cell frequencies of the annual 
tournaments in that subsample. Table 4 is a continuation of table 3 and shows the 
p-values from the chi-square test of the 10 subsamples from the annual split of 
8/4, 7/5 and 6/6, where winners and losers are classified by median. The r and w 
explains whether the results from the cell frequencies are consistent with the 
tournament behaviour (r) or the cell frequencies show anti-tournament behaviour 
(w). We have chosen not to go further with the annual split of 7/5 and 8/4 since 
the results in table 3, as well as further research, show no interesting results. They 
will however still be included in the Appendices. The same goes for the results 
when separating by quartiles. We included this separation to see if being an 
“extreme” winner or loser would affect the result. Throughout the tests we found 
slightly different results, although none of significant importance. Thus, the 
quartile results are from now on presented in Appendix 3, 5 and 7. 
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Table 4:  
 
Table 4: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. R and w represents tournament behaviour and anti-tournament behaviour 
respectively. The table shows the p-values from the chi-square tests from the contingency tables 
used in the BHS approach. Three annual splits (in parentheses) are included. An annual split is 
how we divide each year, where the first digit represents the number of months included in period 
1, and the second digit the number of months in period 2. Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012, 
and is divided into 10 subsamples. Winners and losers are classified in this table as being above or 
below the median fund return respectively. The complete table can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 4 shows that the annual split 4/8 has an economic tendency for tournament 
behaviour, even though only two of the periods have a significant result under the 
5 % level. The second half of the sample (06-12) has significant results in the 
annual splits 4/8 and 5/7. The annual splits 5/7 and 6/6 shows mixed results, 
where some of the periods have results leaning towards anti-tournament 
behaviour. The most interesting results we get from this table is that the 
subsamples 01-03, 06-12, 08-12 and 10-12 has significant results or at least a 
tendency for tournament behaviour in all the three annual splits. There is an 
indication that the month managers risk shift is closer to April. This is seen as 
there are no anti-tournament results in the annual split of 4/8, while the annual 
splits 5/7 and 6/6 have some subsamples that produce anti-tournament results. To 
see if tournament behaviour is only present in some market situations, we 
compare our results with market returns presented in table 1. Our comparison 
(4,8) (5,7) (6,6)
98-12 0,003 r*** 0,162 r 1
98-05 0,195 r 0,485 w 0,195 w
06-12 0,005 r*** 0,008 r*** 0,203 r
98-02 0,084 r 0,894 r 0,506 w
03-07 1,000 0,160 w 0,010 w**
08-12 0,001 r*** 0,000 r*** 0,008 r***
98-00 0,205 r 0,365 w 0,046 w**
01-03 0,157 r 0,084 r* 0,008 r***
04-06 0,546 r 0,132 w 0,003 w***
07-09 0,127 r 0,127 r 0,127 w
10-12 0,080 r* 0,041 r** 0,000 r***
7 and 8 year periods
Whole sample
5 year periods
3 year periods
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showed no clear relationship of tournament behaviour only being present in bull 
or bear markets. 
 
The results from table 4 show signs of tournament behaviour, however in some 
periods we see no significant results and even anti-tournament behaviour. We will 
further test with using standard deviation of residuals instead of monthly returns 
in order to capture idiosyncratic risk shifting. 
 
6.2 Idiosyncratic risk 
By using idiosyncratic risk, we eliminate any risk shifting caused by general 
market factors. This will act as an approximation of the risk the fund managers 
can control. 
 
Table 5 has the same setup as table 4, except that the classification of high risk 
shift and low risk shift is defined by the standard deviation of the residuals instead 
of monthly returns. These residuals are extracted from a Carhart 4-factor FLS 
regression as outlined in equation 5. 
 
Table 5: 
 
Table 5: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. R and w represents tournament behaviour and anti-tournament behaviour 
(4,8) (5,7) (6,6)
98-12 0,402 r 0,018 r** 0,005 r***
98-05 0,765 w 0,485 r 0,369 r
06-12 0,142 r 0,008 r*** 0,002 r***
98-02 0,894 w 0,352 r 0,352 r
03-07 0,815 r 0,349 r 0,349 r
08-12 0,206 r 0,029 r** 0,004 r***
98-00 0,856 r 0,103 r 0,103 r
01-03 0,432 r 0,432 r 0,637 r
04-06 0,132 w 0,366 w 0,763 r
07-09 0,015 r** 0,015 r** 0,360 r
10-12 1,000 0,145 r 0,004 r***
Whole sample
7 and 8 year periods
5 year periods
3 year periods
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respectively. The table shows the p-values from the chi-square tests from the contingency tables 
used in the BHS approach. . Three annual splits (in parentheses) are included. An annual split is 
how we divide each year, where the first digit represents the number of months included in period 
1, and the second digit the number of months in period 2. Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012, 
and is divided into 10 subsamples. Winners and losers are classified in this table as being above or 
below the median fund return respectively. The complete table can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
The most notable result in table 5 is that both the 5/7 and the 6/6 annual split for 
the whole sample shows significant results for tournament behaviour. There is 
also no significant result showing anti-tournament behaviour in any of the 
subsamples. 
 
One peculiar result when using residual approach rather than BHS approach, is 
that the annual split 4/8 now has some tendencies for anti-tournament behaviour, 
even though not significant. Contradictory to this, every subsample of the annual 
split 5/7 and 6/6 indicate tournament behaviour, except one subsample in 5/7. 
Thus, this table indicates that managers risk shift based on performance closer to 
the month of July, instead of closer to April as indicated in tables 3 and 4 
 
There are some contradicting results in table 4 and 5, and this might be because 
systematic risk affects the results in table 4. We will therefore check for 
robustness by testing if systematic risk causes the tournament behaviour results. 
 
6.3 Systematic risk 
We test with systematic risk by using the average beta over the first and second 
period each year as a proxy for risk as explained in the methodology. We extract 
the betas from the regression in equation 5. The statistical explanatory power of 
the factors SMB, HML and momentum is low, and we will therefore not go 
further with them. The OSEBX risk premium coefficient has some statistical 
explanatory power. However, it only has significant results from the chi-square 
test in one subsample in one annual split, 6/6 and 07-09, seen in Appendix 6. This 
means that within this subsample and annual split, any proven tournament 
behaviour could be explained by this market factor. However, when testing the 
same subsample and annual split in the BHS approach, we saw no significant 
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tournament behaviour, such that the result from this robustness test is 
inconsequential. 
 
So far our tests have produced mixed results, and to supplement our findings with 
an additional robustness test, we have chosen to do a single factor regression. 
 
6.4 Regression 
We perform the regression from equation 12, to see how much the first period risk 
and performance affect risk shift. As in our tests above, we have used three 
different proxies for risk, standard deviation of monthly returns, standards 
deviation of residuals, and average beta. Risk from period 1 is included to ensure 
that the model is not biased by omitting a relevant variable. When interpreting the 
regression results we focus on the performance coefficient, since this coefficient 
provides the economic explanation for tournament behaviour.  
 
Table 6: 
 
CONSTANT PERF1 RISK1
(4,8) 0,013*** -0,017** -0,733***
(8,267) (-2,195) (-12,708)
(5,7) 0,012*** -0,022** -0,616***
(6,316) (-2,426) (-8,003)
(6,6) 0,012*** -0,019** -0,555***
(4,984) (-2,017) (-6,022)
(4,8) 0,017** -0,011 -0,021***
(2,243) (-0,874) (-3,08)
(5,7) 0,016** -0,009 -0,021***
(2,198) (-0,667) (-3,04)
(6,6) 0,016** -0,011 -0,02***
(2,141) (-0,879) (-2,97)
(4,8) 0,05*** -0,019 -0,79***
(8,871) (-1,441) (-11,111)
(5,7) 0,036*** -0,016 -0,574***
(6,344) (-0,931) (-6,108)
(6,6) 0,036*** -0,013 -0,543***
(5,133) (-0,497) (-5,505)
Residual
Beta
Standard deviation of returns
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Table 6: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. The table represents the output from the regression in equation 12 where we perform 
a single factor regression. It contains three annual splits (in parentheses) for each of the three 
proxies for risk. An annual split is how we divide each year, where the first digit represents the 
number of months included in period 1, and the second digit the number of months in period 2. 
Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012. T-statistics are presented in the parenthesis under the 
coefficients. Perf1 is the first period fund performance, and Risk1 is the first period fund risk. 
 
Table 6 shows the regression output. The variable risk1 shows significant 
coefficients for all risk measures, all negative. This is expected, because with 
higher risk in period 1, there is less possibility for a high risk shift. We observe 
that performance from period 1 does not have any significant effect on risk shift 
when using average beta or standard deviation of returns as proxies for risk. 
However, when applying standard deviation of residuals as the proxy for risk, we 
get reasonable results. Perf1 is significantly negative in all three periods, which 
implies that higher performance gives lower risk shift from period 1 to period 2. 
The results are in line with tournament behaviour and are consistent with the full 
sample results in table 5, where we use the contingency table and residual risk. It 
should be noted that the Perf1 variable show little effect on risk shift, as the 
coefficients are low. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
In the BHS approach we saw significant results in the whole sample with the 
annual split 4/8, and no significant results in the other samples. BHS and Busse 
found most significant results when using the 7/5 annual split. While they argue 
that managers alter their risk following the release of the second quarter report, 
our results from the BHS approach indicates that risk shifting occurs the month 
after the first quartile numbers are released (May). 
 
When splitting the whole sample into two subsamples in the BHS approach, the 
results reveal that the period 06-12 shows the most indication of tournament 
behaviour in the annual splits 4/8 and 5/7. The result in subsample 08-12 is 
probably the main reason for this, where every annual split show significant chi-
square statistics, 0,001, 0,000 and 0,008 for 4/8, 5/7 and 6/6 respectively. The 
story retells itself in the residual testing; the only difference is that annual split 4/8 
is not significant. The test indicates that idiosyncratic risk shifting is the cause for 
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the tournament behaviour results. This is augmented by testing using systematic 
risk, where we find no significant results. One interesting results is that in the first 
half of the sample, 98-05, there are no significant results in the BHS approach or 
residual approach. The results in the second half of the sample suggest that the 
market has changed into a more competitive environment. A possible explanation 
to the strong result in 08-12 might be the impact of the recent financial crisis and 
its aftermath. Investors were possibly more risk averse, and chose their 
investments more carefully during this period. This could have caused more 
intense tournament behaviour between the funds. Such behaviour represents a 
principal-agent conflict between fund managers and investors. Combining this 
notion with our results from 08-12 could be an indication of fund managers acting 
more on their own behalf when the competitive environment intensifies. In 
addition, technology has improved substantially during our sample period, making 
it much easier for private investors to gain knowledge about equity funds, 
performance and ratings. This could also be a reason for increased tournament 
behaviour. However, we have not studied these topics in depth, but we suggest it 
for further research. 
 
In our regression approach, standard deviation of residuals is the only risk 
measurement that shows significant results for the performance coefficient. This 
reinforces our findings from the previous tests. The performance coefficient is 
significant in every annual split, but they are quite small, so the amount of impact 
they have to risk shifting can be discussed.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
We analyze if Norwegian equity funds have a tendency to alter their risk based on 
their performance relative to competing equity funds, called mutual fund 
tournament. This issue stems from the previous studies that fund managers 
actively seek to increase risk in order to achieve higher returns, such that they take 
advantage of the asymmetric mutual fund flow-performance relationship. Mutual 
fund tournaments produce a principal-agent conflict, in the way that mutual fund 
managers try to maximize raw returns, while their customers desires to maximize 
risk-adjusted returns. Our sample period reaches from 1998 to 2012 and includes 
data from 77 Norwegian equity funds.  
 
When performing our tests, we divide the year into two periods and compare them 
to see if we could observe any changes in risk characteristics from one period to 
the next. We classify each fund, each year by their performance in the first period 
and risk shifting behaviour relative to other funds in the same market. Further, we 
place them by their characteristics and test, by using a chi-square test, whether 
poor performing funds tend to increase their risk more than well performing 
funds. 
 
Our results show mixed findings considering tournament behavior in the 
Norwegian equity fund industry. Results from the first half of the sample period 
(98-05) show no significant results in either of the tests, while the second half (06-
12), shows some significant results. E.g. when splitting the periods into 5 months 
and 7 months, we get a p-value of 0,008 when performing a chi-square test on the 
BHS approach. By testing with idiosyncratic risk, eliminating any risk shifting 
caused by general market factors, the results also show indication of tournament 
behavior in the 06-12 subsample. Although we find significant results in this 
subsample, we are careful to give a definite conclusion about tournament behavior 
in the Norwegian equity fund market. When checking for robustness in the 06-12 
sample by separating it into smaller subsamples, we observe contradicting results. 
E.g. 07-09 show no significant tournament behavior in the BHS approach, and 10-
12 shows only weak signs of tournament behavior when using idiosyncratic risk.   
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To give a more definite conclusion about tournament behavior in the Norwegian 
equity fund market, more research is needed. One possibility is to increase sample 
size by adding funds that invest abroad and/or include other types of funds. This 
may give a clearer answer regarding tournament behavior in the equity fund 
market. 
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9. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Appendix 1: The graph represents the median fund cumulative return from 77 funds, as well as the 
cumulative return of Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index from 1998 to 2012.  
 
Appendix 2 
 
Appendix 2: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. R and w represents tournament behaviour and anti-tournament behaviour 
respectively. The table shows the p-values from the chi-square tests from the contingency tables 
used in the BHS approach. All annual splits (in parentheses) are included. An annual split is how 
we divide each year, where the first digit represents the number of months included in period 1, 
and the second digit the number of months in period 2. Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012, 
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Funds 
Oslo Stock Exchange 
Benchmark Index 
(4,8) (5,7) (6,6) (7,5) (8,4)
98-12 0,003 r*** 0,162 r 1 0,209 w 0,675 r
98-05 0,195 r 0,485 w 0,195 w 0,058 w* 0,090 w*
06-12 0,005 r*** 0,008 r*** 0,203 r 0,922 r 0,024 r**
98-02 0,084 r 0,894 r 0,506 w 0,506 w 0,506 w
03-07 1,000 0,160 w 0,010 w** 0,002 w*** 0,160 w
08-12 0,001 r*** 0,000 r*** 0,008 r*** 0,135 r 0,008 r***
98-00 0,205 r 0,365 w 0,046 w** 0,046 w** 0,103 w
01-03 0,157 r 0,084 r* 0,008 r*** 0,041 r** 0,157 r
04-06 0,546 r 0,132 w 0,003 w*** 0,000 w*** 0,007 w***
07-09 0,127 r 0,127 r 0,127 w 0,542 w 0,067 r*
10-12 0,080 r* 0,041 r** 0,000 r*** 0,145 r 0,080 r*
Median - P-values - BHS
Whole sample
7 and 8 year periods
5 year periods
3 year periods
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and is divided into 10 subsamples. Winners and losers are classified in this table as being above or 
below the median fund return respectively. 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Appendix 3: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. R and w represents tournament behaviour and anti-tournament behaviour 
respectively. The table shows the p-values from the chi-square tests from the contingency tables 
used in the BHS approach. All annual splits (in parentheses) are included. An annual split is how 
we divide each year, where the first digit represents the number of months included in period 1, 
and the second digit the number of months in period 2. Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012, 
and is divided into 10 subsamples. Winners and losers are classified in this table as being above 
the third quartile fund return or below the first quartile fund return respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4,8) (5,7) (6,6) (7,5) (8,4)
98-12 0,001 r*** 0,032 r** 0,118 r 0,242 w 0,845 w
98-05 0,889 r 0,210 r 0,210 w 0,486 w 0,070 w*
06-12 0,000 r*** 0,000 r*** 0,001 r*** 0,339 w 0,133 r
98-02 0,710 r 1,000 0,458 w 0,710 r 0,458 w
03-07 0,870 r 0,253 w 0,253 w 0,002 w*** 0,034 w**
08-12 0,000 r*** 0,000 r*** 0,000 r*** 0,420 r 0,016 r**
98-00 0,446 r 0,799 r 0,204 w 0,799 w 0,446 w
01-03 1,000 1,000 0,029 r** 0,081 r* 0,383 r
04-06 0,527 0,292 w 0,020 w** 0,002 w*** 0,000 w***
07-09 0,000 r*** 0,001 r*** 0,088 r 0,394 w 0,670 w
10-12 0,041 r** 0,041 r** 0,004 r*** 1,000 0,001 r***
3 year periods
Whole sample
7 and 8 year periods
5 year periods
Quartile - P-values - BHS
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(4,8) (5,7) (6,6) (7,5) (8,4)
98-12 0,402 r 0,018 r** 0,005 r*** 0,003 r*** 0,675 r
98-05 0,765 w 0,485 r 0,369 r 0,485 r 0,765 w
06-12 0,142 r 0,008 r*** 0,002 r*** 0,001 r*** 0,379 r
98-02 0,894 w 0,352 r 0,352 r 0,506 r 0,690 w
03-07 0,815 r 0,349 r 0,349 r 0,061 r* 0,483 w
08-12 0,206 r 0,029 r** 0,004 r*** 0,016 r** 0,084 r*
98-00 0,856 r 0,103 r 0,103 r 0,205 r 0,205 r
01-03 0,432 r 0,432 r 0,637 r 0,157 r 0,875 w
04-06 0,132 w 0,366 w 0,763 r 0,366 w 0,035 w**
07-09 0,015 r** 0,015 r** 0,360 r 0,067 r* 1,000
10-12 1,000 0,145 r 0,004 r*** 0,004 r*** 0,041 r**
Median - P-values - Residuals
Whole sample
7 and 8 year periods
3 year periods
5 year periods
Appendix 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. R and w represents tournament behaviour and anti-tournament behaviour 
respectively. All annual splits (in parentheses) are included. An annual split is how we divide each 
year, where the first digit represents the number of months included in period 1, and the second 
digit the number of months in period 2. Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012, and is divided 
into 10 subsamples. The table shows the p-values from the chi-square tests from the contingency 
tables when using residuals as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk. The residuals are produced in a 
regression from equation 5. Winners and losers are classified in this table as being above or below 
the median fund return respectively. 
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(4,8) (5,7) (6,6) (7,5) (8,4)
98-12 0,079 r* 0,006 r** 0,000 r*** 0,032 r** 0,696 r
98-05 0,889 r 0,486 r 0,037 r 0,889 r 0,889 r
06-12 0,020 r** 0,002 r*** 0,001 r*** 0,004 r*** 0,682 r
98-02 0,710 r 0,458 r 0,063 r 1,000 1,000
03-07 0,414 r 0,072 r* 0,014 r** 0,142 r 0,870 r
08-12 0,076 r* 0,036 r** 0,016 r** 0,036 r** 0,629 r
98-00 0,799 r 0,799 r 0,204 r 0,204 r 0,204 r
01-03 0,029 r** 0,029 r** 0,009 r*** 0,383 r 0,663 r
04-06 0,140 w 0,527 w 0,527 r 0,140 w 0,058 w*
07-09 0,001 r*** 0,001 r*** 0,011 r** 0,088 r* 0,670 r
10-12 1,000 0,414 r 0,102 r 0,014 r** 0,414 r
Quartile - P-values - Residuals
Whole sample
7 and 8 year periods
5 year periods
3 year periods
Appendix 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. R and w represents tournament behaviour and anti-tournament behaviour 
respectively. All annual splits (in parentheses) are included. An annual split is how we divide each 
year, where the first digit represents the number of months included in period 1, and the second 
digit the number of months in period 2. Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012, and is divided 
into 10 subsamples. The table shows the p-values from the chi-square tests from the contingency 
tables when using residuals as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk. The residuals are produced in a 
regression from equation 5. Winners and losers are classified in this table as being above the third 
quartile fund return or below the first quartile fund return respectively. 
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(4,8) (5,7) (6,6) (7,5) (8,4)
98-12 0,264 r 0,264 r 0,889 w 0,780 w 0,264 r
98-05 0,618 r 0,369 r 0,369 r 0,765 w 0,765 w
06-12 0,282 r 0,493 r 0,282 w 0,922 w 0,063 r*
98-02 0,506 r 0,231 r 0,143 r 0,894 w 0,894 r
03-07 0,640 r 0,815 r 0,640 w 0,483 w 0,815 r
08-12 0,420 r 0,565 r 0,300 w 0,730 r 0,135 r
98-00 0,856 w 0,587 r 0,365 r 0,587 r 0,856 w
01-03 0,875 w 0,875 w 0,637 w 0,271 w 0,432 w
04-06 0,132 r 0,070 r* 0,366 r 0,763 r 0,228 r
07-09 0,127 r 0,360 r 0,015 w** 0,360 w 0,127 r
10-12 0,770 w 0,560 w 0,381 r 0,560 r 0,560 r
Median - P-values - OSEBX Coefficient
Whole sample
7 and 8 year periods
3 year periods
5 year periods
Appendix 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. R and w represents tournament behaviour and anti-tournament behaviour 
respectively. All annual splits (in parentheses) are included. An annual split is how we divide each 
year, where the first digit represents the number of months included in period 1, and the second 
digit the number of months in period 2. Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012, and is divided 
into 10 subsamples. The table shows the p-values from the chi-square tests from the contingency 
tables when using betas as a proxy for systematic risk. The betas are produced in a regression from 
equation 5. Winners and losers are classified in this table as being above or below the median fund 
return respectively. 
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(4,8) (5,7) (6,6) (7,5) (8,4)
98-12 0,435 r 0,696 r 0,032 w** 0,696 r 0,435 r
98-05 0,889 w 0,889 w 0,329 w 0,676 r 0,889 w
06-12 0,219 r 0,494 r 0,040 w** 0,891 r 0,219 r
98-02 0,458 r 0,137 r 1,000 0,265 r 0,710 r
03-07 0,624 r 0,142 w 0,034 w** 0,253 w 0,624 w
08-12 0,259 r 0,420 r 0,147 w 0,420 r 0,147 r
98-00 0,446 r 0,204 r 0,204 r 0,204 r 0,446 r
01-03 0,383 w 0,383 w 0,081 w* 0,663 w 0,383 w
04-06 0,833 w 0,527 w 0,527 w 0,833 w 0,527 r
07-09 0,088 r* 0,394 r 0,394 w 1,000 0,670 r
10-12 0,683 r 0,683 r 0,014 w** 0,683 r 0,414 r
Quartile - P-values - OSEBX Coefficient
Whole sample
7 and 8 year periods
5 year periods
3 year periods
Appendix 7 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: *, **, *** represents significant chi-square p-value on the 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level 
respectively. R and w represents tournament behaviour and anti-tournament behaviour 
respectively. All annual splits (in parentheses) are included. An annual split is how we divide each 
year, where the first digit represents the number of months included in period 1, and the second 
digit the number of months in period 2. Our sample period is from 1998 to 2012, and is divided 
into 10 subsamples. The table shows the p-values from the chi-square tests from the contingency 
tables when using betas as a proxy for systematic risk. The betas are produced in a regression from 
equation 5. Winners and losers are classified in this table as being above the third quartile fund 
return or below the first quartile fund return respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1996, Brown, Harlow and Starks (BHS) proved a significant competitive 
relationship amongst mutual fund managers in the US market, called a “mutual 
fund tournament”. Their findings suggested that funds alter their risk halfway 
through the year depending on their mid-year performance, and implied that 
under-performers increased risk to improve their competitive position, while over-
performers decreased risk to lock in their profits. After the article by BHS was 
published, a number of research papers have studied the same behavior in the US 
market, as well as other markets. However, studies on mutual fund tournaments 
has never been done on the Norwegian market, and this motivates us to explore if 
there can be found similar tendencies in this market. In our thesis we will analyze 
if Norwegian mutual fund managers have a tendency to alter their risk based on 
previous performance. This market can be intriguing to focus on, since it is 
smaller and more volatile than many of the other markets previously studied. This 
leads us to our research question: 
 
Do Norwegian mutual fund managers make risk adjustments to their investment 
portfolio according to mid-year performance? 
 
The basis of this type of tournament is that the different fund managers compete 
with each other in order to get new assets. An increase in funds asset value yields 
higher compensation to fund managers as they often are rewarded by a percentage 
of their funds asset value (Golec 2003). This creates an incentive for the managers 
to attract new capital, and might create a principal agent conflict between 
managers and investors. Guercio and Tkac (2008) studied this incentive by 
comparing Morningstar ratings with fund flow. Their findings suggested that 
mutual fund investors use ratings as a primary input in their decision process. This 
in turn provides under-performing fund managers with incentives to increase risk 
mid-year in order to increase the possibility of ending the year with a higher 
rating, and hence attract more capital. The relationship between flow and 
performance is consistent with the tournament described by BHS (1996) and has 
later been proved by several studies such as Chevallier and Ellison (1997) and 
Kemp and Ruenzi (2008). A study by Sirri and Tufano (1998) found that investors 
disproportionately flock to invest in high performing funds, while not to a similar 
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extent flee low performing funds. If managers are compensated on the basis of the 
fund's inflow, managers’ payment has similarities to a call-option, in the sense 
that raising risk gives a higher expected return. Additional incentives for 
managers to risk shift is that good performance equal good personal reputation 
and employee safety (Hu et al. 2011). Other studies regarding mutual fund 
tournaments have found differing results, such as Busse (2001). He found that 
tournament behavior did not exist in the U.S mutual fund market. Due to the 
conflicting results in the US market and the different methodologies used, we find 
mutual fund tournaments an interesting topic. 
 
To study the tournament effect in the Norwegian market, we use a similar 
approach as the one used by BHS (1996). The returns and the volatility of the 
returns (risk) will be measured using monthly data provided by our supervisor. 
Sample period reaches from 2000-2010 and includes data from 70 Norwegian 
equity funds. We will divide the year into two 6-months periods and compare 
them to see if we can observe any changes in risk characteristics from one period 
to the next. 
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2. Key information 
 
The Norwegian mutual fund industry is closely monitored by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSA), and inflicts the market with a number of 
rules and regulations. E.g. in order be classified as an equity fund in Norway, a 
fund needs to have at least 80 % of the assets invested on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange (OSE). Norwegian equity funds also has to have stocks in at least 16 
different companies, and no more than 10% of the fund's assets should be 
allocated in one stock (Finanstilsynet 2012). This shows that a fund, by law, has 
an obligation to be somewhat diversified. The Norwegian mutual fund industry's 
total value was NOK 581.2 billion in the end of Q32012 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 
2012), and the total value has more than tripled in value since 2004. This shows 
that the Norwegian mutual fund industry is expanding rapidly.  
 
In mutual funds there are normally 3 different types of investor fees: Front-end 
load, back-end load and operating expense. Front-end load is the fee you pay 
when you buy a stock in a fund, back-end load is the fee you pay when you sell a 
stock in a fund, and operating expense fee is the management fee and this is 
normally paid as an annual percentage of the assets invested in the fund. The 
management fee is one of the main incentives for managers to maximize the 
inflow to the fund, as mentioned earlier. 
 
Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) states that fund managers have three ways to alter 
the risk profile of their portfolios. The first option is to change the allocation of 
assets and cash; the second option is to buy less risky assets/sell risky assets in 
order to alter systematic risk. Changing the idiosyncratic risk of the portfolio is 
the last option; this will change the funds diversification and overall risk. 
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3. Literature review 
 
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) (BHS) investigate if the competiveness in 
mutual fund industry can affect fund managers decisions. They introduce an 
annual "tournament" between mutual funds, were the managers compete for fresh 
capital based on their performance relative to each other. This is due to the fact 
that most mutual fund managers are evaluated by end-year results, and that mutual 
fund ranking systems are usually given annually. They found that funds labeled as 
mid-year losers tend to increase the risk of their portfolio in the latter part of an 
annual assessment period to a larger extent than mid-year winners. This implies 
that the competitive mutual fund environment is effectively changing how fund 
managers acts, and subsequently might change their objectives from a long-term 
to a short-term perspective. They also found that as investor awareness increased 
towards fund ranking systems, tournament behavior occurred more frequently. 
 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) look at risk-changing behavior inside a mutual fund 
family rather than between different funds as BHS (1996) did. The intuition 
behind their research is that fund managers within a family are incentivized by the 
top management to perform better by direct and indirect compensation through 
advertising, marketing and compensation. Decisions regarding these three 
activities are usually done at the end of the year, such that an intra-firm 
competition arises amongst the fund managers in order to attract the most 
compensation. Their findings suggest that a mutual fund tournament exists within 
the family; fund managers do alter their funds risk profile dependent on their mid-
year rank. Further on they find evidence that the degree of risk taking is more 
excessive for larger families than for smaller ones. The smaller families actually 
behave in an opposite manner, the mid-year winners take on more risk than losers, 
suggesting cooperation between funds is more present in smaller families. They 
conclude that such tournament behavior inside a mutual fund family is not optimal 
from an investor point of view, since the risk adjustments is not done by the 
means of optimizing portfolio, which causes extra rebalancing costs. The lack of 
cooperation within the fund could also lead to unnecessary agency costs. This 
principal agent conflict has earlier been studied by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) 
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Chevalier and Ellison (1997) studied the risk-adjusting behavior of fund managers 
in the light of principal agent conflict between them and investors. A mutual fund 
manager is motivated by maximizing value by increasing cash inflows, while 
investors are interested in maximizing their risk-adjusted return. Chevalier and 
Ellison put the flow-performance relationship as an implicit incentive for funds to 
alter the risk profile of their portfolios. In the first part of their research they prove 
that mutual funds willingness to hold unsystematic risk is dependent on its 
position relative to the market index at the end of September. Their results suggest 
that fund managers change the riskiness of their portfolios between September and 
December which is consistent with the incentive to take risk calculated from the 
flow-performance relationship. This is further studied by Guercio and Tkac 
(2008). 
 
Guercio and Tkac (2008) investigate the effect of the Morningstar star rating on 
mutual funds. Morningstar rates funds from 1-5 stars based on their past 
performance and future estimated results. In their study they find that an upgrade 
or downgrade of the rating on a mutual fund has a substantial affect on flow of 
capital from retail investors. This suggests that the Morningstar's star rating 
system is the primary input of many mutual fund investors' decisions and has 
economically significant affect on the funds. Discrepancy between this study and 
prior studies is that Guercio and Tkac found that investors punish funds that lose 
its position amongst the top third ranked funds (goes down to 3-star rating). The 
Morningstar-effect can be seen as soon as one month later. This effect shows that 
funds with 4-star rating might have different incentives according to risk 
depending on if they are closer to a downgrade or an upgrade.  
 
Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2008) investigate if risk shifting of the fund portfolio 
has an impact on the fund's performance. They compare funds that have a stable 
level of risk with funds who risk shifts. Results reveal a strong relationship 
between risk shifting and fund performance. Mutual funds that shift risk tends not 
beat the market, while funds with the most consistent risk levels tend to 
outperform the market. The study implies that even though risk shifting usually 
does not enhance performance, it is often implemented for a number of different 
reasons. One of these reasons are the managers incentives to take excessive risk in 
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order to possibly increase future fund inflows, which is one of the reasons mutual 
fund tournaments exists. 
 
Busse (2001) uses the article of BHS (1996) as his basis. His results were 
consistent with BHS when using monthly returns. However, Busse (2001) also 
examines the same relationship by using daily returns. He proves that the 
tournament effect disappears when using daily data. In his analysis he argues that 
this is because daily return autocorrelation biases the monthly volatility estimates. 
The daily data further reveal that the intra-year change in a funds risk is mostly 
changes in the common stock market risk factors. He questions the reliability of 
earlier research, since daily data provide more precise estimates of volatility. 
Busse explains that it is not clear when mutual fund managers risk shifts 
according performance, since ratings and fund flows occur on a daily basis. This 
creates more complexity when researching tournament behavior. 
 
There have been several studies on mutual fund tournaments and similar topics in 
recent years. E.g. Koski and Pontiff (1999) found similar results as BHS (1996), 
although their study showed that mutual funds that used derivatives for hedging 
changed their risk profile to a lesser degree. Schwarz (2012) found that the reason 
for mixed result regarding these tournaments strains from a sorting bias. The 
convex relationship between performance and fund flow found in studies, e.g. 
Chevallier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), failed to hold in the 
study by Spiegel and Zhang (2012). A research by Elton et al. (2010) used 
holdings data rather than returns to find evidence of tournament behavior, and 
with this method they found results not congruent with earlier studies. The article 
by Hu et al. (2011) and Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009) shows that employment 
risk also act as an incentive to risk shift. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.1. Data 
Our study will be based on monthly returns from 70 Norwegian Equity funds, and 
our sample period is from 2000-2010. As previously mentioned, these funds need 
to have at least 80 % of their assets invested on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) to 
be classified as Norwegian Equity funds. In addition to monthly returns from 
Norwegian funds, we will apply data on average managers’ fee on these funds. 
This is to examine if Norwegian fund managers have similar incentives to US 
mutual fund managers, based on compensation. All our data will be provided by 
our supervisor. 
 
To perform the analysis, we will arrange the data yearly, in order to research 
annual tournaments. Further we will only include funds, in the yearly tournament, 
if it has returns for every month of the year. Thus a mutual fund that started out 
during a tournament will not be included that year. 
 
 
4.2. Methodology 
In this part we will study if Norwegian mutual fund managers make risk 
adjustments to their investment portfolios according to mid-year performance. We 
have monthly returns from 70 Norwegian mutual funds over the course of 10 
years. In our approach we follow the literature by BHS (1996) which has been 
used in a number of studies concerning mutual fund tournament research. We will 
start by summarizing the data sample, and extract relevant descriptive statistics, 
such as number of funds and total asset value. To be able to perform a comparison 
between first and second half of the year, we divide the year into two parts of six 
months. The first part is from January to July, and second part is July to January.  
 
First, we will allocate mutual funds based on mid-year performance. This is done 
by calculating the cumulative return of each mutual fund after six months for each 
of the 10 annual samples. We calculate the first half cumulative return (RTN) as 
follows: 
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Where rj is the j'th mutual fund return for each month, y is the tournament year 
and 1-12 are the months of the year, January(1) to December(12). We will then 
annually rank the RTN of each fund from highest to lowest, and separate them 
into two groups, mid-year winners and losers. Winners are classified as the funds 
that are above that year's median RTN value, and losers are classified as funds 
that are below. Secondly we will calculate the risk adjusted ratio (RAR). This is a 
measure of the ratio between the volatility before and after the mid-year mark. 
RAR is calculated by taking the standard deviation of a fund after the first six 
months and divide it by the standard deviation of the last six months.  
 
        
               
  
   
   
    
               
 
   
   
  
 
Where 1p and 2p is first and second period respectively. RAR shows if the returns 
of a mutual fund is more volatile after mid-year (>1) or less volatile (<1), and is a 
indication of whether the manager of the mutual fund makes risk adjustments to 
his portfolio from first to second half of the year. Now we have RTN and RAR for 
each fund over the course of 10 years. To test our research question we create a 
(RTN, RAR) pair for every fund each year and split these pairs into four cells: 
(winner/higher risk shift), (loser/higher risk shift), (winner/lower risk shift) and 
(loser/lower risk shift). “Higher risk shift" and "lower risk shift", are allocated 
based on if the mutual fund is above or below the median RAR value respectively. 
As in BHS (1996) we form a 2x2 contingency table that contain all the mutual 
funds for a specific year. 
  
Further we will test if there is a significant difference in the allocation of the 
mutual funds in the cells, or if there is an equal amount of mutual funds in each 
cell. 
 
Our null hypothesis: 
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Our alternative hypothesis: 
    
    
 
    
    
                      
 
To test the null hypothesis, we will use a chi-square test to find if the cells 
(loser/higher risk shift) and (winner/lower risk shift) has a measurably higher 
frequency than the other two cells. If we find a significant difference in the risk 
shifting of winners and loser, we can research further why mutual fund managers 
act this way. 
 
4.3. Further/alternate research 
Based on the results found in our research, we could add alternate methods to get 
a more explicable result. There are many alternate research methods used in 
attempt to improve the original research done by BHS (1996). Chen and 
Pennacchi (2009) suggest using tracking error volatility instead of return 
volatility. This is because of the diverse results in prior studies of United States 
mutual fund tournaments, and that volatility in returns could sometimes not give a 
valid view of mutual fund managers risk adjustments. Busse (2001) also used a 
different method than the original BHS (1996) research. He used daily returns of 
mutual fund rather than monthly returns. The reason behind this is that he believes 
the daily return autocorrelation bias the monthly volatility estimates.  
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5. Our expectations 
 
Due to the Norwegian market being smaller than previous studied markets, we 
may find stronger results of mutual fund tournament. The Norwegian market is 
considered more volatile than the US market, where most of the prior studies were 
performed. Hence, fund managers can more easily risk shift with fewer alterations 
to their portfolio. Based on this we expect to find evidence of mutual fund 
tournament in the Norwegian market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRA 19002 – Preliminary Report   15.01.2013    15.01.2013 
Page 11 
6. Progression plan 
 
15th of January: Preliminary report hand-in. 
 
16th-31th of January: Deeper studies of topic and collecting data. 
 
February/March: Work on our analysis and prepare presentation. 
 
March/April: Complete first draft for feedback. 
 
1st of May: Hand-in of first draft for feedback. 
 
May/June: Correct and improve thesis after feedback. 
 
20th of June: Hand in final thesis. 
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